Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have unique properties that can be exploited to design new privacy-enhancing technologies that minimize the negative impact to the utility of CPS. In this paper we show two examples of these properties.
(e.g. a smart grid system whose frequency deviates signi cantly from 60Hz).
To address these concerns, in this paper we show how privacy in cyber-physical systems present di erent challenges and opportunities compared to traditional database privacy. Due to the physical system dynamics, feedback control, and inherent noise, di erent tools from control theory can be extended to design novel privacyenhancing technologies.
In particular, we focus on stochastic control systems and on how the inherent uncertainties of the system (e.g., sensor noise, and disturbances) can be used to ensure certain levels of privacy. In particular, we introduce a methodology to inject the minimum amount of di erential-privacy noise to ensure our desired levels of privacy by leveraging the noise already available in the system. In the second part of the paper we show that for some systems, the addition of external noise can prevent them from operating safely, and therefore we propose a new de nition of privacy focused on obscuring the presence or absence of events and show that we can meet that de nition without adding noise. In this case, we show how a discretionary sampling, consensus-based control strategy enables us to hide information about speci c events and ensure privacy with minimal costs to stability and convergence rates.
Privacy from a control-theory perspective has started to receive some attention in the last couple of years [2, 12] . Di erential privacy has been a particularly popular tool proposed for estimation and control [4] . These previous papers have not considered how the inherent noise of stochastic control systems can reduce the amount of noise that needs to be added in di erential privacy.
Our previous work considered the idea of minimizing data collection through the use of discretionary sampling [8] . In this paper we extend our previous work by showing proofs of convergence and stability. In addition we show how this discretionary sampling mechanism compares to di erential privacy, and also show how adding noise can a ect the safety of the system.
Preliminaries
where δ > 0. ϵ can be considered as an upper bound on the amount of in uence an individuals record has on the information released and δ is an approximation parameter that relaxes the privacy denition. L 1.4. Gaussian Mechanism [6] : For a dataset D and a query q, a Gaussian mechanism M = q(D) + η preserves (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy if η is drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with σ ≥ 2 ln(1.25/δ )∆ q,2 /ϵ.
Graph theory: Let G = V, E, A G represent an undirected graph, where V = {1, . . . , N } is the set of nodes or vertices, and E = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ V} is the set of edges or adjacent nodes. The adjacency matrix A G = [a i j ] is the symmetric matrix N × N , where a i j = 1 if (i, j) are adjacent, a i j = 0 otherwise, and a ii = 0 for all i ∈ V. For the i t h node, the degree of a vertex d i is the number of neighbors that are adjacent to i, i.e., d i = N j=1 a i j . A sequence of edges (i 1 , i 2 ), (i 2 , i 3 ), . . . , (i r −1 , i r ) is called a path from node i 1 to node i r . The graph G is said to be connected if for any i, j ∈ V there is a path from i to j. The degree matrix is D = dia (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d N ), and the Laplacian of G is de ned as L = D − A G . Disconnected graphs can be divided into c connected subgraphs G = G 1 ∪. . .∪G c . A right stochastic matrix is a real square matrix, with each row summing to 1.
DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVATE OUTPUTS
CPS monitor physical processes and take control decisions based on these measurements in order to drive the process to a speci c state, or to behave in a speci c manner. A general way to describe CPS is as a feedback control system, where the process evolves over time generating streams of data, such that at each time instant k, x(k) = [x 1 (k), x 2 (k), . . . , x n (k)] describes the system states; for instance, hourly power consumption of a set of electricity users or monthly weights of a group of individuals. The information that is transmitted to a controller is y(k) = [ 1 (k), . . . , m (k)], which is the output of the system (e.g., sensor measurements). Each i (k) is equivalent to a query that takes the entire dataset (states) x(k), and discloses statistical information about the dataset. For example, the average of the vector x(k). The measurements y(k) are then sent to a controller who computes a control signal u(k) to drive the states of the system to a desired state (e.g., a control strategy modi es the price of electricity in order to shape the power consumption).
We consider x(k) that contain sensitive information, and therefore their values have to be protected against an adversary trying to make inferences about individual states (e.g., each user consumption) with the possible help of side information. To deal with this problem, di erential privacy has emerged as a framework to ensure privacy by perturbing the exact output before it is released. More speci cally, DP adds random noise η i (k) ∈ R to each output i (k), to produce a new private output¯ i (k) = i (k) + η i (k), as illustrated in Figure 1 .
On the other hand, one of the unique properties of CPS is that a dynamic system possesses inherent sources of uncertainties and noise, such as the noise of the sensor readings or statistical perturbations to the state of the system. These inherent uncertainties are modeled in classical control theory as being random stochastic process, and they can reduce or eliminate the noise required by di erential privacy, which we call inherent di erential privacy. In other words, the output y(k) is already random, even without the addition of di erential privacy noise η(k), and guarantees a certain level of di erential privacy.
Notice also another di culty of adding external di erential privacy noise to CPS: in many practical applications, adding external noise to sensor measurements may not be easy. For instance, modifying thousands of smart meters, or replacing thousands of loop detectors in a highway such that they start including new random DP noise may incur in large costs. For this reason, taking advantage of inherent noise already in the system may help to preserve privacy without adding or changing the sensors.
In the following section we will de ne inherent di erential privacy for linear-time invariant control systems.
Linear Time-Invariant System with Inherent Noise
Linear Time Invariant (LTI) systems are a classical model for control systems. They can be used to model a large variety of physical processes and how they respond to a control input. The advantages of LTI systems is that they can be characterized by using linear algebra tools. The typical control-theoretic model of an LTI system is the following,
where A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m , C ∈ R p×n are matrices that help to describe the system evolution over time, for a given control input u(k) ∈ R m . This system is stochastic, because ω(k) ∈ R n and v(k) ∈ R p are zero-mean Gaussian noises with variances σ 2 ω , σ 2 . The randomness in the system is typically used to model system uncertainties, external perturbations, and sensor noise. Since v(k) is an i.i.d. vector of zero-mean Gaussian noise, we can de ne the intensity matrix (covariance matrix) R as a diagonal matrix with elements σ 2 ,i . Similarly we can de ne the intensity matrix of ω(k), R ω . Let C i j be the elements of matrix C such that the i th output
. In order to analyze how the random variables ω, v will a ect the system, it is necessary to de ne a control strategy. Depending on the controller, the random noise may be ampli ed or attenuated, therefore the inherent privacy of the system is strongly connected to the control action. In this work, we focus on output-feedback control, but our analysis can be easily extended to other types of controllers.
Output Feedback Control.
We assume that the controller consists of an output feedback control of the form u(k) = Ky(k).
, we can simplify Eq. (1) by de ningĀ = A + BKC:
where φ is a linear combination of Gaussian random variables. The covariance of φ(k) is described by
One particular property of feedback stochastic systems, is that the variance of the system states is not constant and it evolves over time. Therefore, it is possible to characterize the variance of y(k) to de ne the inherent level of privacy of the feedback system without adding di erential privacy noise. Noise-driven systems have been widely studied in the control theory literature [3] and it is possible to nd an expression of the variance evolution and how the inherent noise is ampli ed or attenuated by the feedback system.
Since the state is a vector of size n, the variance of x(k) is de ned by a matrix
Combining Eq. (4) for k + 1 with Eq. (2) yields the dynamics of the variance matrix :
Since the noise φ is independent of the states, the operator E[.] over all cross terms become zero. Combining with Eq. (4) we have that
IfĀ is stable, Q(k) will converge to Q [3] , which is the solution of the Riccati equation of the formĀQĀ + R φ − Q = 0. These results help us for computing the variance of y(k), ar (y(k)) = Q (k) = CQ(k)C + R . Clearly, the output y(k) can be described by a Gaussian distribution with a time-varying standard deviation σ ,i (k) that corresponds to the square root of the diagonal elements of Q (k).
Inherent Di erential Privacy
We have obtained an expression for the time-varying standard deviation of the output σ ,i (k) that depends onĀ, C, R φ , and R . In order to relate σ ,i (k) with the di erential privacy framework, we can de ne the sensitivity of the output as follows.
Let x, x be two γ -adjacent data sets according to De nition 1.1. Let y = [y(0), y(1), . . . , y(T )] be the trace output vector of x and y the output from x for T iterations. We can de ne the sensitivity of the noiseless output for two γ -adjacent state traces x, x by
Recall from De nition 1.1 that at each time instant k, all the elements of x(k), x (k) are equal except for the l th elements, such that
is a linear combination of the elements of the dataset, we have that
The sensitivity is then bounded by
Recall Lemma 1.4, where given δ and σ , we have the following ϵ level of privacy,
In our formulation, because the standard deviation of inherent noise of the output evolves over time, the total level of privacy of the entire time-series also evolves over time, and it can be de ned by
Therefore, without the addition of di erential privacy noise, we have obtained (ϵ , δ )-di erential privacy that depends only on the inherent noise of the system. Notice that the term min i σ ,i (k) indicates that privacy is dictated by the less noisy output. Also, it is worth to highlight that, according to Eq. (6), the variance of the states depends on the control parameter K (sinceĀ depends on K), such that tunning K may lead to a larger level of privacy.
Injecting minimum noise
We have shown how the typical uncertainties assumed in most control systems can help to maintain an inherent-level of di erential privacy that evolves over time depending on the system dynamics and the control algorithm; however, some applications may require a desired level of privacy ϵ, δ . As a consequence, if ϵ < ϵ, it is necessary to inject additional noise to the system.
Recall that if two random variables are Gaussian, then their addition is also a Gaussian random variable. Because the noise typically inherent in control systems is Gaussian, by adding a Gaussian DP mechanism η(k) ∼ N (0, σ 2 η ) to the system outputs, we are able to add the remaining Gaussian noise needed to achieve our desired ϵ, δ . In practice, noisy measurements may cause a degradation in the system that can wear down actuators or lead the states to undesired values. For this reason, it is important to inject the minimum amount of noise necessary to preserve a desired level of privacy. Since the variance of the output is time-varying, the variance of the added noise should also evolve over time, according to the following Theorem. T 2.1. Let ϵ, δ be the parameters of the desired level of privacy. Let σ 2 be the desired variance of the form
If at each time instant k, the di erential privacy mechanism adds noise η with an intensity matrix that satis es
the mechanism ensures (ϵ, δ )-Di erential privacy.
Proof:
which satis es the desired privacy level.
CASE STUDY: REAL-TIME PRICING IN SMART GRIDS 3.1 Demand Response Model
To show the generality of our approach, we include an example from smart grid problems. The goal in demand response systems is to incentivize consumers (industry or residential) to modify their electricity consumption x(k) based on an electricity cost signal λ(k) provided by the utility or by a demand-response company like EnerNOC.
In this section we follow the real-time pricing model from Tan et al. [21] . This model considers a market with N consumers of electricity, a set of suppliers of electricity, and a third party entityan Independent System Operator (ISO)-with the goal of matching supply and demand by setting the market price for electricity. The general assumption is that the ISO determines, at each time instant k ∈ N + , a clearing price λ(k) valid for the period of time [k · τ , (k + 1) · τ ] (this is called an ex-ante market) every τ hours (e.g., τ =0.5h) and announces it to the suppliers and consumers.
The electricity demand of each user is characterized by two components: a baseline electricity consumption b i (k) that captures the electricity consumption that is independent of the pricing mechanism (i.e., the necessary power to satisfy the main consumer needs at each instant k such as refrigerator, cooking devices, light bulbs), and a price-responsive demand r i (λ(k)), which captures the amount of electricity consumption that can be controlled by the pricing signal λ(k). For instance, doing laundry when the price is low, or turning o the lights of rooms that are not being used.
The Constant Elasticity of Own-price (CEO) has been commonly adopted to characterize the total price-responsive demand [7, 13] . The CEO model is de ned by
where D i > 0 is a constant that properly scales r i (k) and ψ i ∈ (−1, 0) is the price elasticity demand that captures how the demand is a ected by a speci c price λ(k) [13] .
The electricity used by each consumer is given by the following model,
where
linearly relates the CEO model, α indicates the e ect of the past consumption in the current demand and we assume it is the same for all users, and ω i (k) is a random noise that models the uncertainty in how consumers will react to market prices. The total power consumption is given by
Similarly, for the supply of electricity, Tan et al. [21] propose a linear regression between supply and cost, a model they validated with the Australian Energy Market Operator and the electricity market in California. Under these assumptions the total supply of electricity can be modeled by x s T (k + 1) = pλ(k) + q, where p and q are parameters estimated by historical market data from the area of study.
Control Objective
The control objective of the ISO is to send price signals λ(k) to the users to keep the error between supply and demand of electric power E(k) = x s T (λ(k)) − x c T (λ(k)) close to zero for every time instant k. This can be seen as a control problem in which the system to be controlled is the outcome of a market, the control variable is the price signal λ(k) and measured variable is the error E (k) = E(k) + T (k) for T (k) being the total measured noise. Figure 2 shows the feedback interaction between the consumers or smart meters, suppliers, and the ISO. The consumption of users is monitored by the smart meters and each smart meter sends x c i to an Energy Data Center (EDC) or directly to the ISO to obtain the aggregated value x c T (k) [20] and calculate the measurement E (k). The information released by the EDC can be used by a third party like the ISO to calculate new prices.
Aggregator/EDC
The price signal λ(k) must be carefully designed in order to avoid oscillations or even instability [17, 21] . The proposed integral control strategy in [21] is described by
which has been proven to keep the system stable with an appropriate selection of K. The compact representation of the real-time pricing model is given by
Note that our previous analysis of variance and inherent privacy can be applied to this model for
Di erential Privacy in RTP
Smart meters allow the utility provider to monitor consumption in order to update prices or adjust generation. However, due to the accuracy and granularity of the data, it could be possible for a curious entity to estimate behavior pro les of each user, and identify their consumption patterns. For example, with the eld of nonintrusive load monitoring, it is possible to extract information about the type of appliance that is being used [14] . Since the EDC derives aggregated statistics from consumer information, it is necessary to ensure that it is not possible to learn anything about the activities of individual households. For example, a third party that has access to x c T cannot tell whether or when a user was doing laundry. The system uncertainties ω, are able to maintain certain levels of privacy ϵ (k) for data aggregation, as it was de ned in Eq. (7). In the case where additional noise is required, it is necessary to add noise η(k) to the aggregated information x c T (k) at each instant k, such that the the new DP output is¯ E (k) = E (k) −η(k). This mechanism for smart meters is inspired by previous privacy mechanisms, such as the distributed smart grid di erential privacy problem introduced in [1] , where each smart meter adds noise from Gamma distributions, such that the aggregation results in a Laplace noise. However, in this work we focus on Gaussian mechanism, which can be easily deployed in a distributed fashion.
Experiments
For our experiments, we use a distribution feeder speci cation [18] which covers a moderately populated urban area composed by 1405 households. We model the consumption behavior of each user using the linear model introduced above. Based on [21] , we draw the parameters from a normal distribution
0 . α i = 0.1kW and K = 1. Additionally, we use a half-hourly baseline consumption b i (k) based on historical data provided by the NY ISO such that b i (k) ∈ [0.28, 0.76] kW . We assume that the maximum consumption is x c max = 1.6 kW and T = 24 h, such that the sensitivity is ∆ o,2 = 24x c max . For the supply model, we use the parameters p = 43.6e − 4, q = 1.28, which are scaled versions from experimental data from the NSW region in Australia (see [21] for further details on the selection of these parameters), ω i (k) ∼ N (0, 0.007 2 ) and i (k) ∼ N (0, 0.006 2 ). Figure 3 depicts the supply-demand mismatch E(k) for a 24 h period and for the control parameter K = 1. The control is able to take the output close to zero for λ 0 = 21 $/MW h. Note that due to the system and sensor noise, E(k) is a random variable from a Normal distribution. Since we only have one output, σ (k) = Q (k). This parameter evolves over time until it reaches its steady state, therefore according to Eq. (7), the inherent privacy level ϵ (k) also evolves in time.
The control parameter K plays a fundamental role not only in the stability of the system but also in its noise-attenuation or ampli cation properties also called sensitivity (which should not be confused with the sensitivity of di erential privacy). Sensitivity is a tool from control theory usually implemented to analyze how an external input (e.g., disturbances) a ect the system output. As it was studied in [9] , the proposed RTP strategy tends to amplify high frequency inputs as K increases. In our case, Gaussian noise has spectral components in all frequencies, which means that the injected noise tends to be ampli ed with K. Figure 4 illustrates the steady state standard deviation of the output σ for di erent K and for δ = 0.01. Clearly, the closest the system approaches an instability region, the largest the output noise becomes. Note that a speci c level of privacy can be obtained without adding any privacy mechanism. For instance, if K > 1.5, (0.1, 0.001)-di erential privacy can be preserved.
On the other hand, Figure 4 (bottom) depicts the steady state ϵ for di erent K and δ . Clearly, since δ relaxes the privacy de nition such that less noise is required, it is possible to ensure di erent In order to achieve a desired level of privacy, it may be necessary to add a di erential privacy mechanism η(k). The intensity of the noise that has to be injected can be obtained according to (8) . We aim to maintain (0.1, 0.01)-di erential privacy, such that, according to De nition 1.4, σ d ≥ 0.354. Without DP, σ tends to 0.133, such that additional noise is necessary. Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the standard deviation σ η (k) of the injected noise that maintains a constant σ = σ d with minimum noise, such that (0.1, 0.001)-di erential privacy is preserved for all time. 
NOISELESS PRIVACY MECHANISMS
As we studied before, adding noise enables some desired levels of privacy by making outputs indistinguishable for changes in at most one user. However, some systems are very susceptible to external noise and even convergence to a desired steady state can be a ected. For instance, Figure 6 depicts a distributed frequency control system with a di erential privacy mechanism. The control objective is to maintain frequency of all nodes in the grid (i.e., distributed generators, loads) synchronized to 60 Hz. Unfortunately, the addition of noise caused the frequency to uctuate and reach unsafe states (i.e., frequency should not uctuate more than 1 Hz).
In particular, distributed control strategies that rely on the exchange of local information are largely a ected by the injection of noise [19] . For instance, the well known consensus algorithm tends to a Brownian motion that never reaches a steady state. In the rest of this work we focus on distributed multi-agent strategies, for which DP might not be a practical solution, and thus require di erent privacy enhancing mechanisms.
Privacy of Random Events
A di erent domain of privacy consists on focusing only on speci c changes in the dataset that we call events. Let us consider the system in Eq. (1) with output (k) = Cx(k).
Let Ω e = {t e1 , t e2 , . . .} be the set of time stamps at which events that need to remain hidden occur. We consider only one event at each t ek ∈ Ω e and it changes the i th system state by a magnitude ∆x i (t ek ), such that y(t ek ) = Cx(t ek ) + ∆ (t ek ), where ∆ (t ek ) = C[0, . . . , 0, ∆x i (t ek ), . . . , 0] is the change in the output caused by the event. Notice that ∆x i (t ek ) can be considered as an impulse function that suddenly changes the states only at the instant t ek and is zero otherwise. For instance, if the states are already in the equilibrium, the event will take the system to new initial states and then they will converge again to the equilibrium. Thus, we call event duration to the time it takes to the system to recover from the event, i.e., time to converge to the steady state. The magnitude of the event a ects the event duration, such that it is necessary to keep both of them private. For example, imagine that the employees in a company do not care about maintaining privacy of their salaries so there is no need to add noise to a query that uses their information. However, at a point, one of them may not want to share a salary increase, so she prefers just to share her previous salary. This kind of changes that may or not be given to a query can be represented as an uncertainty in the states similar to ω(k) in Eq. (1). As another example, we can consider the power electricity consumption of a military base. In order to ensure a correct power scheduling and control, it is necessary to share speci c consumption information with peering micro-grids so that they remain synchronized; however, at the times of military tests they can share outdated information and hide the current consumption state to prevent malicious adversaries from inferring these events (see Figure 7) .
We call this type of privacy event-based privacy, where only speci c events are meant to remain private. This type of privacy for control systems was rst introduced in our previous work [8] , where we analyzed the consensus algorithm with sampled information such that the amount of data transmitted to some neighbors is minimized, hiding the presence of some events. In particular, our previous work proposed the notion of discretionary sampling as a new privacy enhancing technology for control systems. Frequency (Hz)
Private events
M ili ta ry te st Tu rn -o ff G en er at or Figure 7 : Example of events in a smart grid. It is necessary to share information about events in order to ensure a correct behavior of the system, but some of these events need to remain private.
Synchronization of Multi-Agent Systems
The type of systems that we want to analyze are known as multiagent systems (MAS). MAS can model interactions among agents that share local information in order to achieve a common goal. MAS have been widely studied in several research elds, such as communications, social networks, vehicle coordination, and neuroscience, just to name a few. One of the most popular MAS models is known as the consensus algorithm, where a group of agents update their state (e.g., X,Y position of a vehicle) by comparing their current states with a set of neighbors [15] . Let G p (V, E p , A p ) be the physical graph that describes the natural information ow among N agents with adjacency matrix A p . The continuous-time MAS model is described by 
where a i j are the elements of matrix A p , and u i is a control action that helps to achieve speci c objectives. Typically, when u i = 0 for all i, consensus is only achieved if the graph representing the interaction between agents is connected [15] . Based on the results in [10] and [8] , a communication network can be included in order to allow synchronization to a desired state even if the physical graph G p is disconnected. Thus, the communication network compensates the lack of connectivity. Let G c (V, E c , B c ) be the communication graph that describes the exchange of information through a communication network. Figure 8 illustrates both topologies and how they interact to form a joint graph that compensates the lack of connectivity. The control action that drives the states to a desired reference x r relies on the information transmitted through the communication network, an is described by
Using the properties of the Laplacian matrices, the system dynamics can be described in compact form by
where L p , L c are the Laplacian matrices of the physical topology and the communication network, respectively. Let
Stability of this type of systems depends completely on L T . If all eigenvalues of L T are positive and it only contains one zero eigenvalue (the union of both graphs is connected), all the states converge to x r . We want to extend our previous results [8] and take advantage of some properties of consensus-like systems that let us to manipulate the amount of information that is transmitted through the communication network, in order to preserve the privacy of events. First, let us de ne the synchronization algorithm with sampled information.
Consensus with Sampled Information
We can de ne τ j (t) as the data received at the instant t, which is held using a zero-order hold. This value can be described by a piecewise function that remains constant in the interval t ∈ [kτ , (k +1)τ ), for τ > 0 (the sampling period). We make two main assumptions: i) the information that each controller i knows about x i is not sampled and it is continues; ii) the information received from neighbors is sampled and corresponds to τ j (t). By de nition, the Laplacian matrix can be divided into L c = D c − B c , and we can rewrite the consensus algorithm as follows
. LTI dynamic systems with sampled information and a zero-order hold can be described in a discrete-time fashion by de ning the transformation matrices Φ = e −L T τ and
(17) Clearly, the information that is being transmitted corresponds to the system states, such that (k) = x(k). As a consequence, conditions for synchronization are given by the eigenvalues of P = Φ + Γ, according Theorem A.1, and stability is preserved independently of the sampling period τ if the union of the physical and the communication graphs forms a connected graph; i.e., the eigenvalues of L T are positive and L T contains only one zero eigenvalue.
Convergence Time
Even though the proposed synchronization system achieves synchronization in nite time independently of the sampling period, convergence time increases with τ . It is possible to nd some bounds on the time it takes for all agents to reach the desired reference x r based on the discrete-time representation.
Let S be the matrix formed by the eigenvectors of P and Λ be the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. Then, using the diagonalization transformation we can rewrite the discrete-time system as x(k +1) = SΛS −1 x(k). Solving the di erence equations we obtain
We prove in Theorem A.1 that the eigenvalues of P µ i (P) are inside the unitary disk, such that the sequence is a Cauchy sequence, and for m, n > k * ,
. . , µ N +1 ) corresponds to the eigenvalue matrix. Therefore, from (18) we have that
, which yields to convergence when the elements of Λ k * tend to zero, except for the eigenvalue equal to 1. We de ne µ 1 = 1 > |µ 2 | > . . . > |µ N +1 | the ordered eigenvalues of P and |μ | the largest eigenvalue di erent from 1. The convergence state is reached after k * steps such that
for ς > 0 signi cantly small. It is easy to verify that |µ k i | = |µ | k , which leads to k * ≤ ln(ς)/ln(max |µ i |) = ln(ς)/ln |μ |, and that the convergence time t * is bounded by τ · k * . Note thatμ depends on the sampling period τ , since P depends on τ . Now that we have de ned the main properties of synchronization under sampled information, we can introduce two event-based privacy mechanisms.
Privacy Mechanisms
Using the results obtained above, we can de ne two privacy mechanisms that aim to hide information about the magnitude and duration of an event. Event thought an adversary can note that some information is missing, it would be hard to infer speci c properties about the event.
4.5.1 Privacy by Data Minimization. As it was described above, an event consists on a sudden change in the system states that causes oscillations while the controller drives the system back to stability. Figure 9 depicts an example of an event whose information is transmitted with di erent sampling periods. Note that with a small sampling period, it is more likely that information about the event will be transmitted. On the other hand, increasing the sampling period increases the chances that information from an event will be hidden. As we shown above, our proposed control strategy maintains stability independent of the sampling period. Therefore, we can hide information by minimizing the amount of data shared between agents. However, since the transmission of information is periodic, it is not possible to ensure that all events will remain hidden. Therefore, it is be possible to select a sampling period τ that minimizes the amount of sensitive information that is shared, but is not possible to ensure complete privacy. See for instance Figure 12 which depicts the number of shared events with respect to the sampling period for the case study introduced below.
One of the main advantages of data minimization is that it is not necessary to know the speci c time of an event.
Discretionary Sampling: Selecting When to Sample and
When to Lie. In discretionary sampling, each agent is able to lie about each of the events that needs to remain private.
Notice that if an agent decides not to send information during an event, an adversary can notice that the agent is silent and therefore it can infer it is trying to hide an event. Therefore, instead of not sending updates during the event, we force agents to repeatedly send the last sampled data before the sensitive event started. For instance, if it is necessary to hide the information between times k1 to k2, the transmitted data in that interval will correspond to (k1 − 1), which is the last piece of information shared before k1. Using some results from switched control systems with packet losses [22] , we are able to obtain the conditions that achieve synchronization while hiding any desired information. Let z(k) = [x(k), y(k − 1)] be the augmented state variable. Let α(k) ∈ R N +1 be the matrix whose diagonal elements α i (k) = 1 if a packet in node i is transmitted and 0 if it is sending outdated data in the instant k.
The stability of these types of systems can be determined by the set of matrices A j , such that A T = A 1 A 2 . . . A k . Therefore, if A T contains a spanning tree, synchronization is achieved as stated in the following Lemma. L 4.1. Let A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k be the sequence of time-varying matrices. If A i is stochastic and if the union of the set of directed graphs has a spanning tree, the matrix product A T = A k A k −1 . . . A 1 also possesses a spanning tree such that there exists a vector ν that satis es A T ν = ν .
Recall from Theorem A.1 that P is right stochastic. Since ϕ + Γα(k) + Γ(I − α(k)) = P and the summation of α(k), (I − α(k)) is I , matrix A(k) in Eq. 19 is right always stochastic. The following Theorem establishes conditions for synchronization with discretionary sampling. T 4.1. Let us consider the controlled system with sampled information in Eq. (19) with the proposed discretionary privacy mechanism. Synchronization is asymptotically achieved in nite time if conditions in Theorem A.1 are satis ed and each agent hides its information for at most T i < ∞ steps.
Sketch of the proof:
According to Lemma 4.1, it is necessary to ensure that the union of the sequence of directed graphs possesses a spanning tree. Since P = Φ + Γ is stable and, T i is nite, updating the information at least after T i iterations ensures the existence of a spanning tree in A(k). Thus, synchronization to the reference state z(∞) → x r 1 2N is asymptotically achieved . While large sampling intervals might miss some events, they cannot provide strong privacy guarantees. Discretionary sampling (i.e., lying) can, however, achieve perfect secrecy if required (it can hide all events if the operator wants) at the cost of longer consensus settling times. Besides, to execute a discretionary sampling strategy it is necessary to have prior knowledge of all the event times and their intended durations, which is not always possible.
Impact of Discretionary Sampling.
Similarly to the increasing sampling mechanism, we can nd some bounds on the convergence time for the discretionary sampling case. Recall that discretionary sampling transmits data at a base sampling period τ and then each agent may choose to hide some speci c information for at most T i steps. Let T = maxT i be the maximum number of steps any agent can hide information. Since hiding information delays the system convergence to the consensus state, the worst case occurs if all agents start hiding information simultaneously at an instant k h during T steps such that their next state update occurs at k h + T . Clearly, this is equivalent to sampling at a sampling period ofτ = τT . Thus, we can de
andP =Φ +Γ. The maximum time of convergence is then bounded by t * ≤ τT ln(ς)/ln(μ) forμ the largest eigenvalue di erent from 1 ofP.
Comparison with Di erential Privacy for Events
The discretionary sampling mechanism can be analyzed from the di erential privacy framework by making some assumptions about ∆x and taking advantage of its uncertainty. We can assume that ∆x is drawn from a Uniform random distribution. In other words, the likelihood of occurrence of an event ∆x ∈ [∆ min , ∆ max ] is uniform and the PDF is of the form
otherwise .
Let us consider the states x(k e ) and its adjacent state x (k e ) = x(k e ) + ∆x(k e ), where ∆x(k e ) = [0, . . . , ∆x l (k e ), . . . , 0] such that an event occurs in the state l at a time k e . Notice that i (k e ) is a linear combination of the dataset x(k e ). Therefore, in the presence of an event in state l and, since there is only one event at each time instant,
When the event is hidden, we assume ∆x l (k e ) = 0, i.e., i (ke) = n j=1 C i j x j (k e ). The relationship between the likelihood of an output with an event or hiding the event is then given by
The probability over the entire domain of is equal with and without an event, such that it is not possible to distinguish whether or not the event was hidden. This is ϵ = 0 Di erential privacy, which is the highest level of privacy. As a consequence, for the discretionary sampling mechanism, even if the transmitted information consists of a sequence of the same data during a time T , it does not a ect the privacy of the system states. In other words, an adversary observing the same data for several iterations, may suspect that some information is being hidden, but the magnitude and duration of such information is never revealed.
Experiment: Microgrid Synchronization
Microgrids can be de ned as a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy sources that can interact with other microgrids or with the main grid. One of the main properties of microgrids is that they can supply power even if they are disconnected from the main grid. The problem of frequency synchronization among microgrids is important to ensure a correct connection and disconnection and avoid undesired oscillations or even instability. We model the power network using a multi-agent approach. We de ne the set of N agents as V, where each one can be modeled as synchronous generators or DC-sources with inverters [5] . We assume that the power AC network is described by the purely inductive admittance matrix Y ∈ jR N ×N , the nodal voltage magnitude E i for all i ∈ V. The physical interaction of the power grid can be modeled as a graph G p = {V, E, A p }, where the elements of A p are a i j = |E i ||E j ||Y i j | and correspond to the maximum real power transfer between nodes i and j.
Let x i (t) corresponds to the frequency of each node. The dynamics of the system can be described by
where D i > 0 is a damping coe cient for synchronous generators, and it is also related with the slope of the droop controller of DCsources with inverters. The control action is the one described in Eq. (14) . We consider the IEEE 30 nodes benchmark in Figure 10 , where Area 2 is disconnected such that two physically isolated microgrids are formed. A communication network ensures synchronization by exchanging information between the two microgrids. Figure 11 depicts the convergence time for di erent sampling periods and di erent control parameters K. Note that if K is small the convergence time increases considerably. Moreover, while large sampling periods lead to better privacy, as illustrated in Figure  12 , they also increase the time to achieve synchronization, which a ects the system performance. For instance, if it is necessary to reconnect the two microgrids and they are not synchronized, it could cause undesired oscillations or instability of both microgrids. Similarly, discretionary sampling ensures perfect privacy without a ecting synchronization in nite time. However, if the duration of the events that need to remain private is large, the convergence time will also increase. Figure 13 depicts the system behavior for τ = 5, T = 20 for both privacy mechanisms.
Note that discretionary sampling prevents the transmission of any important event, however with periodic sampling the presence of the event is still evident. 
CONCLUSIONS
Privacy in CPS introduces new challenges due to the interaction of a physical system with transmitted data. In particular, we formulated the inherent privacy level of feedback control systems from the di erential privacy perspective by taking advantage of the system uncertainties by using tools from stochastic control systems theory. We found that there is a relationship between the inherent privacy level and the feedback control parameter K which is related to the system capacity to attenuate/amplify noise. We also proposed 
No Discretionary Sampling
Real frequency Shared data Figure 13 : Frequency excursion of node 14 for K = 5 and τ = 5 for both privacy mechanisms.
a novel privacy mechanism that injects the minimum amount of noise in order to achieve a desired (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy. Finally, we introduced a novel privacy de nition focused on events and we proposed a noiseless privacy strategy that exploits some properties of multi-agent systems. We also investigated the trade-o s between minimizing data transmission via periodic sampling and with discretionary sampling. The inherent properties of CPS investigated in this paper are an example of why classic security tools developed for information technology problems need to be reconsidered when we want to apply them to CPS. The science of CPS security and privacy requires the development of new models and tools beyond the direct application of traditional security and privacy technologies.
De nition A.1. The Perron matrix P ∈ R n×n of a graph G is a right stochastic matrix satisfying P1 = 1, such that 1 is one of its eigenvalues. For µ 1 > µ 2 . . . > µ n its eigenvalues, if µ 1 = 1 and |µ i | < 1 for i=2,. . . ,N+1, then the discrete-time system converges to a consensus state [15] . T A.1. Consider the synchronization model with distributed sampled measurements in (16) . We de ne A = K D c + L p and B = K B c and we obtain the discretized model in Eq. (17) , where P = Φ + Γ. If P is a Perron matrix then the states exponentially converge to the reference state x r independent of the sampling period.
Proof
Recall that Φ = e −Aτ and Γ = ∫ τ 0 e −As dsB = A −1 I − e −Aτ B. Let us de ne L d as a matrix associated to P by
First, we have to show that L d is a Laplacian matrix. As P = Φ + Γ, from (21) we obtain L d = A(I − P) = A − Ae −Aτ + e −Aτ B − B, which leads to
+ e −Aτ KB c − KB c .
Recall that L c = D c + B c and A − B = L p + K L c = L T . Since G p is an undirected graph, then A is symmetric and we can group the terms in (22) such that
A is positive de nite and diagonally dominant, such that I −e −Aτ is symmetric and positive. L T is a Laplacian matrix and Ld is then also a Laplacian matrix. Now, we have that
Let λ max A be the maximum eigenvalue of K D c + L p , η max the maximum eigenvalue of L p and d max the maximum value of the diagonal matrix K D c . Due to the symmetry of both terms, using the Weyl's inequality [11] we have that λ max A ≤ η max + d max . Therefore, the matrix P is bounded by
Note that the diagonal elements of the Laplacian matrix L T /λ max T are positive and less than one and the term I − e −L T τ ≤ I for any τ > 0, such that P is a Perron matrix independently of τ . Consequently, the states reach a consensus, which corresponds to x r .
